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On the Interpretability of Law: Lessons from the
Decoding of National Constitutions
JAMES MELTON, ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG AND
KALEV LEETARU*
An implicit element of many theories of constitutional enforcement is the degree to which those subject
to constitutional law can agree on what its provisions mean (call this constitutional interpretability).
Unfortunately, there is little evidence on baseline levels of constitutional interpretability or the variance
therein. This article seeks to ﬁll this gap in the literature, by assessing the effect of contextual, textual
and interpreter characteristics on the interpretability of constitutional documents. Constitutions are
found to vary in their degree of interpretability. Surprisingly, however, the most important determinants
of variance are not contextual (for example, era, language or culture), but textual. This result emphasizes
the important role that constitutional drafters play in the implementation of their product.
After almost two years of heated debate, drafting and re-drafting within committees, over
1,000 roll-call votes, and behind-the-scenes negotiation, the 587 delegates to the 1987–88
Brazilian Constitutional Assembly rested. Their hard work was presumably done. The
delegates then turned their product over to a ‘linguistic consultant’, whom the Assembly
charged with the critical task of rendering their 245 Articles into readable and accessible
Portuguese.1 Legal precision and carefully negotiated terms of the Constitution aside,
this was to be a legal document that ordinary Brazilians would be able to read and
understand. The effort was consistent with the ‘plain language’ movements that
occasionally arise in English-speaking countries, seeking to make technical language
more user-friendly.2 As it happened, however, most of the consultant’s edits were rejected.
Some viewed these rejections as missed opportunities to achieve greater constitutional
interpretability and clarity.3 Perhaps, however, the document was already quite intelligible
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1 Such efforts to clarify language at the end of constitutional negotiations are not unprecedented. The
framers of the US Constitution created a Committee on Style to ‘revise the style of, and arrange, the
articles which have been agreed to by the House’. The Committee, however, made substantive proposals,
such as to include a bill of rights, and most of its suggestions were rejected.
2 Erwin Steinberg, ed., Plain Language: Principles and Practice (Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State
University Press, 1991); Jeffrey Barnes, ‘The Continuing Debate About ‘‘Plain Language’’ Legislation:
A Law Reform Conundrum’, Statute Law Review, 27 (2007), 83–132; Wim Voermans, ‘Styles of
Legislation and Their Effects’, Statute Law Review, 32 (2011), 38–53, pp. 39, 47.
3 Milton Guran, ed., O Processo constituinte, 1987–1988 (Brasilia: AGIL/UNB, 1988).
or – by contrast – so unintelligible as to be beyond the skills of the best wordsmith. We do
not know, just as we do not know how reliably citizens and elites can interpret their own
constitutions or those of other countries.
Brazil’s situation raises an important set of questions: to what degree do citizens and
elites agree about what constitutions say and, assuming some variation, which factors
affect relative levels of interpretability? The gap between the technical language of
professionals and the understandings of ordinary laymen who are subject to legal rules is
a pervasive issue with regard to law.4 Interpretability – by which we mean the ability to
produce inter-subjective agreement about the meaning of a text – may be a particularly
important attribute of constitutions.5 Constitutions are core documents that establish the
legal system and regulate ordinary law-making processes, and many believe that
constitutions that are difﬁcult to interpret will undermine the rule of law more generally.
Some also argue that constitutions that are easy to interpret are more likely to be
enforced. Some even argue that constitutions should be universally accessible documents
in that they should be understood by legal professionals and laymen alike, by all members
of a society no matter their language or cultural background, and perhaps most
importantly, by future generations as well as contemporaries. If the constitution is highly
context-dependent – culturally, geographically or temporally – it is unlikely to be
serviceable in highly fragmented societies and will not preserve its commitments across
generations. In short, self-enforcement, inter-generational commitment and national
unity – three of the most important challenges facing constitutions – are likely to be
directly affected by the ease with which legal texts can be interpreted.
As with many aspects of law, there is signiﬁcant debate surrounding the virtues
of interpretability, or clarity, a closely related concept. While we generally think
interpretatability is beneﬁcial, we recognize that this beneﬁt is not absolute and that
arguments supporting vague or unclear laws are not uncommon.6 Regardless of one’s
normative views, one might agree that, as an empirical matter, the degree of inter-subjective
agreement about constitutional provisions merits reporting. To this end, however, we
lack basic empirical points of reference on the measurement of interpretability in
comparative law, not to mention any systematic understanding of the factors that lead
to more or less of it.
The primary reason for this omission is the difﬁculty in measuring the concept. One
hypothetical approach would be to survey citizens and elites from various time periods
and locations about the relative ease of interpreting different constitutional texts. Such an
approach, however, faces obvious practical difﬁculties. This article takes an alternative
approach. We employ data from the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP), a research
project that was conceived with the goal of assessing the origins and consequences of
written constitutions of most independent countries in existence since 1789. The CCP uses
multiple coders to analyse each constitutional text and discrepancies between coders are
4 John Gibbons, ‘Language and the Law’, Annual Review of Applied Linguistics, 19 (1999), 156–73,
p. 161.
5 Interpretability is thus related to the idea of indeterminacy, though our research does not spring
from debates in legal theory surrounding the latter concept (e.g., Mark Tushnet, ‘Defending the
Indeterminancy Thesis’, Quinnipiac Law Review, 16 (1996), 339–56.). Still, one can think of indeterminacy
as an antonym to the term without much loss in meaning.
6 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Incompletely Theorized Agreement’, Harvard Law Review, 108
(1995), 1733–72; Louis M. Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution: A New Defense of Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001).
2 MELTON, ELKINS, GINSBURG AND LEETARU
reconciled by an additional coder.7 This process serves as a kind of simulation of real-
world constitutional interpretation by lower and appellate courts. We analyse data on
inter-subjective agreement from this coding exercise in order to assess the various
attributes of constitutional texts and constitutional settings that enhance or inhibit
consensus on the meaning of the text. In some sense, one may think of this analytic
strategy as one in which we vary the contextual characteristics of the text while holding
roughly constant the experience, knowledge and cognitive skills of the interpreters.
Our results are surprising. One would think that the coders, who were primarily
graduate students working in North America in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, would have
great difﬁculty understanding constitutions from different contexts, and that we would
observe a bias towards modern constitutions produced in countries with cultural and
political traditions similar to those of the United States. While we do ﬁnd that
constitutions vary signiﬁcantly in their level of interpretability, contextual barriers do not
seem to challenge readers. Constitutions written in bygone eras, in different languages, or
in extremely different cultural milieux are no less interpretable by readers than are those
written in closer temporal and cultural proximity. Instead, our results suggest that
predictors of interpretability reside in the composition of the text, a result that emphasizes
the importance of constitutional drafting. Indeed, some of the most consequential
predictors of interpretability have to do with structural elements of the text that had been
crafted long before any ‘linguistic consultant’ became involved.
DOES CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETABILITY MATTER?
Any reader will appreciate a clearly written document, legal or otherwise, and advocates of
plain language have periodically sought to exhort writers to consider the end-users.8 However,
interpretability may be an especially valuable quality with respect to the law. Many accounts
of law in general, and constitutions in particular, emphasize the importance of elements that
relate to interpretability. Lon Fuller’s classicMorality of Law, for example, placed clarity and
internal consistency (in the sense of lacking contradictions) as central elements to the rule of
law.9 Both of these elements are directly related to our notion of interpretability.
As Voermans puts it, ‘We know that complex verbose legislation, full of jargon and
legal constructs, not only complicates comprehension and interpretation but also irritates
its audience and may otherwise tend to undermine its authority.’10 Fuller stated the
problem thus: ‘it is obvious that incoherent and obscure legislation can make legality
unobtainable by anyone, or at least unattainable without an unauthorized revision which
itself impairs legality.’11 Interpretability is necessary for the producers of law to
7 One might argue that it is the interpretability of the constitutional order that really matters, not the
interpretability of the constitutional text. By this logic, our whole enterprise would seem trivial. We
disagree. Not only is it impractical to assess each countries’ constitutional order over time, but more
importantly, the constitutional text is the foundation of the larger constitutional order. As a result, one
can learn much about the constitutional order from a systematic study of constitutional texts. At the very
least, whether the interpretability of the constitutional text or the constitutional order should be given
priority is an empirical question that requires a ﬁrm understanding about the causes of both.
8 Carl Felsenfeld, ‘The Plain English Movement’, Canadian Business Law Journal, 408 (1981–82),
408–20, p. 411.
9 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964).
10 Voermans, ‘Styles of Legislation and Their Effects’, p. 40.
11 Fuller, The Morality of Law, p. 63.
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communicate with the law’s subjects: in the extreme, one cannot expect any form of
communication (including that about law) to be at all meaningful in a Tower of Babel.
A closely related aspect of predictability concerns the consistent application of the law
across iterated cases by multiple and disparate ofﬁcials. Without clear law, one cannot
know how to behave and, thus, the relationship between enforcers and subjects can
become arbitrary. When law is vague, it can be interpreted by the adjudicator in
a discretionary fashion. In the words of Hayek, ‘One could write a history of the decline
of the rule of law, the disappearance of the Rechtstaat, in terms of the introduction of
these vague formulae into legislation and jurisdiction, and of the increasing arbitrariness
and uncertainty of, and consequent disrespect for, the law and the judicature.’12 Law, by
its nature, requires the theoretical possibility of compliance, and unclear law can lead to
its arbitrary application, either intentionally or unintentionally.
In the now familiar line of work on self-enforcement, scholars such as Hardin,
Ordeshook and Weingast have argued that law is sustained when it provides a focal point
for private enforcement efforts.13 Only when the subjects of a constitution can credibly
threaten to enforce it will constitutional order (and the rule of law) be sustained. Such
‘self-enforcement’ is critical because, in most cases, there is no external agent who will
enforce the rules of the constitution. Self-enforcement occurs when subjects of the
constitution are willing to take costly action, and they will only do so when they believe
that others will join them.
This inter-subjective expectation can be facilitated by the text of the constitution. The
constitutional text can help subjects to co-ordinate their enforcement efforts by providing a
focal point.14 For the text to act as an effective focal point, however, it is essential that the
text be clear, so that subjects can develop a common understanding about the rules of the
game. Note that an unclear text may fail to generate self-enforcement, even if every agent
has the same interpretation of the constitution, since each agent’s interpretation will involve a
high degree of uncertainty about what other agents believe. Lack of interpretability impedes
the common knowledge necessary for an effective focal point. If the government violates
your right to free speech, but the formulation of the right is so vague that you are unsure
that others will share your deﬁnition, you will discount the probability that others will join
you in the enforcement effort, thus making self-enforcement less likely. The implication here
is that constitutionalism requires that law be easily and – more to the point – consensually
interpretable: effective limits on government will only be possible if they are clear.15
We recognize, of course, that clarity is not an absolute virtue, and may at times be quite
inconvenient. In much the same way that democratic governance entices electoral losers
12 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1944), p. 81.
13 Russell Hardin, ‘Why a Constitution?’ in Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds, The Federalist
Papers and the New Institutionalism (New York: Agathon Press, 1989); Peter C. Ordeshook, ‘Constitutional
Stability’, Constitutional Political Economy, 3 (1992), 137–75; Barry Weingast, ‘Democracy and the Rule of
Law’, American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), 245–63; Rui de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, ‘Self-
enforcing Federalism’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 21 (2005), 103–35; Barry Weingast,
‘Designing Constitutional Stability’, in Roger Congleton and Birgitta Swedborg, eds, Democratic
Constitutional Design (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006).
14 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conﬂict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980);
Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and
Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
15 To be sure, though, substance matters: very clear rules that generate many losers are unlikely to be
effectively self-enforced.
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to abide by current electoral outcomes on the hope of success in future elections, a vague
constitution might entice constitutional losers into compliance on the hope that the
constitution’s provisions could be interpreted differently in the future.16 Furthermore, many
constitutional theorists emphasize the importance of leaving things vague, or ‘incompletely
theorized’, in order to obtain agreement at the level of broad principle.17 For instance, while
many would agree that freedom of speech should be guaranteed, it would be much harder
to achieve agreement on precisely where to draw the line between protected speech and
libellous or hate speech, or even what constitutes ‘speech’. For issues like these, trying to
obtain consensus on the precise meaning of concepts may be impossible or inadvisable.
Furthermore, the relevant audiences need not involve the average citizen. Many legal texts –
say, a credit card contract – are addressed primarily to elites, so technical language that
befuddles laymen may have precise referents in legal discourse and case law.
Constitutions, however, are different in important respects from credit card contracts.
More so than almost any other legal instrument, constitutions are meant to be written,
read and understood by those subject to their provisions. In this sense, constitutions are
closer to marriage agreements, in which the vows are often drafted, proclaimed and
enforced by the participants themselves. The important idea of self-enforcement, as we
stress above, is one reason why constitutional texts and marriage vows ought to be known
and understood by the participants. Another is that both legal instruments perform an
important unifying role. Particularly in new multi-ethnic countries, whose citizens lack a
long tradition as a political community, constitutions serve to bring heterogeneous
interests and beliefs together. As we elaborate below, constitutions bear the burden of
imparting basic principles across heterogeneous groups, whose principal bond may be a
constitutional document. So, constitutional ideas need to travel, without signiﬁcant
distortion, across cultural groups. Even more obviously, constitutional ideas should travel
across generations. Constitutions – widely understood as commitments with a counter-
majoritarian basis – are designed by the dead to govern the living. It follows that the
living should have a basic understanding of the words of the dead.
In general, then, we think of mutually interpretable law as having some inherent
virtues. Nevertheless, we recognize that there are conditions under which a legislator’s
target can and should be unclear. In particular, vague provisions can be necessary to
make a constitutional bargain feasible and may even help to create a more enduring
document if they prevent the creation of permanent constitutional losers. Given these
realities, we are hesitant to render an unconditional judgement about the merits of
constitutional interpretability and, instead, believe this debate is best resolved by future
research on this topic. Of course, to conduct evidence-based research on the topic, one
must be able to measure the interpretability of constitutions, and in order to understand
the consequences of interpretability, one must ﬁrst understand its causes. Therefore, the
analytical strategy and ﬁndings reported in the remainder of this article might be seen as
the foundation for future scholarship on this topic.
SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETABILITY
What factors affect the interpretability of constitutional documents? Analytically, it is
useful to think of the sources of indeterminacy as pertaining to one of three sets that
16 Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution.
17 Sunstein, ‘Incompletely Theorized Agreement’.
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operate at descending levels of measurement (and descending degrees of theoretical
interest to us). These threats to interpretability derive from (1) the constitutional setting in
which the text was drafted, (2) the constitutional text itself, and (3) the individual
interpreters of the constitutional text. Our principal theoretical concern is with the ﬁrst
category – the interpretation of constitutions across context. In this section, we introduce
the theoretical expectations undergirding the problem of cross-contextual interpretation
and stipulate a set of hypotheses implied by such as well as hypotheses related to aspects
of indeterminacy associated with the second and third sets of factors.
The Constitutional Setting
We begin with the indeterminacy that is associated with the challenge of interpreting
constitutions across context, such as those that span many languages, cultures, regions
and eras. This issue of context, for reasons that we intimate earlier, is our principal
concern. The theoretical and normative challenge is simply stated, perhaps deceivingly so.
Constitutions are meant to be unifying and time-independent documents; interpretation,
however, is often viewed as context-dependent. This line of thinking – call it
contextualism – is perhaps taken to extreme lengths by critical legal scholars who view
indeterminacy as ubiquitous, but the basic point is widely shared.18 Expression – legal or
otherwise – is rooted in norms of understanding that are culturally and temporally
bounded.19 Those outside the limits of the author’s world may well come to very different
understandings of his text. This sort of thinking is consonant with the views of
constitutional theorists who emphasize the importance of indigenous design.20 The worst
kind of design process, in this line of thinking, is one that imports models conceived for
other countries in other times.
With respect to temporal context, the question is whether contemporary readers can
parse constitutional text written generations earlier. From the historical dustbin of
constitutionalism, one could conceivably pick any one of many examples to which time
has not been kind, but consider Article 124 in the Bolivian Constitution of 1831: ‘Three
instances only are permitted in law suits. Appeals on the grounds of injusticia notoria
(literally, notorious injustice) are abolished.’ Readers might agree that the ﬁrst clause of this
article expresses a rule against quadruple jeopardy, but the second – the business about
‘notorious injustice’ – is altogether unfamiliar (and unintelligible) to modern ears. In fact,
notorious injustice was a legal concept used by the Council of Indies, the judicial and
administrative arm of the Spanish crown in the Americas. The term referred to legal defences
based on due process violations – defences that were abolished, with little explication, by a
number of early nineteenth-century Latin American constitutions (for example, Argentina
1816, Venezuela 1819 and Peru 1828). The question of inter-generational communication is
of obvious importance to constitutionalism more generally. Indeed, the idea that
constitutional commitments would constrain future generations is central to the very basis
of higher law and, for many, the very idea of a constitution.21 Constraining successive
18 Mark Tushnet, ‘Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis’.
19 Richard H. Fallon, ‘A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation’, Harvard
Law Review, 100 (1987), 1189–286; Gibbons, ‘Language and the Law’; Voermans, ‘Styles of Legislation
and Their Effects’.
20 Noah Feldman, ‘Imposed Constitutionalism’, Connecticut Law Review, 37 (2005), 857–89.
21 Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional Self-Government (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 2001).
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governments puts a premium on interpretability: it is hard to think how the ‘dead would
govern the living’ if the living cannot understand the dead.22 The temporal hypothesis
that we propose to test, therefore, is that older constitutions will be harder to interpret by
modern readers.
Language is an equally important issue, as the example regarding injusticia notoria
indicates. As we know, the words and phrasing chosen by constitutional drafters are often
(but certainly not always) scrutinized, interpreted and re-interpreted carefully. When
constitutions in multi-ethnic states are disseminated in many languages, distortions in
translation can alter meanings as well as cloud them. If the important rule-of-law criterion
of generality is to obtain, then the meaning of law must be retained across translations.
The scope of this challenge is potentially quite signiﬁcant: depending on one’s
enumeration, roughly half of contemporary states include a sizeable minority group
whose members speak a different language from those in the majority.23 Many states –
from Chad to China – have more than one ofﬁcial or national language. In cases of
colonialism or military occupation, some constitutions have been written in languages
wholly foreign to the majority. Many African countries, for example, had their initial
constitutions drafted as statutes of the British Parliament in English, without regard to
the vernacular of the country. Even in Norway – a country that scores at the top in ethnic
homogeneity and whose constitution has lasted nearly 200 years – linguistic problems
arise. The Norwegian Constitution was drafted in 1814 in Danish, since a standard
written form of Norwegian had not yet materialized. Even the original Norwegian-
language versions of the text, ﬁrst transcribed in the 1900s, were actually written in an
archaic form of the language by today’s standards. Our hypothesis with respect to
language is that translated documents will exhibit higher levels of indeterminacy.
Apart from language, we recognize that other differences in culture could also lead to
indeterminacy. It is well known that constitutional ideas migrate quite freely across states,
either voluntarily or involuntarily (in the case of imposed constitutions).24 In terms of the
viability of imported ideas, one wonders whether their interpretation will be muddied in
the process. That is, if a country decides to transplant – with little preparation – a foreign
set of constitutional provisions, will the interpretation of these provisions be distorted? To
be sure, part of the problem of transplantation has to do with overcoming issues of
translation across languages. It is quite possible, however, that – quite apart from any
language barrier – institutional arrangements in region A will be easily misunderstood by
citizens in region B, who have not been socialized to think about structures of government
in the way of A. What is the contemporary citizen from Buenos Aires to make of a ‘Privy
Council’ or those from Mumbai to think of ‘courts of amparo’? These are foreign
institutions that may not ﬁt easily into whatever cognitive schema organizes a citizen’s
understanding of governance. Our basic expectation is that constitutions from cultures
foreign to readers will be less interpretable than those that originate closer to home. This
might also include legal culture: coders from common law countries might have an easier
time interpreting constitutions written under similar legal systems.
22 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to James Madison, 6 September 1789.
23 Minorities at Risk Project, Minorities at Risk Dataset, available from: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/
mar/data.asp, (2009).
24 Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional
Ideas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
On the Interpretability of Law 7
The Constitutional Text
Foreign and aged texts may well befuddle contemporary readers, but unclear writing
knows no limits – whether spatial, cultural or temporal. We thus recognize the distinct
possibility that the compositional structure of the writing – regardless of its provenance –
will be associated with variation in interpretability. Notwithstanding any defects, the US
Constitution of 1787 is often praised for its plain, accessible style, but many of its
provisions are quite vague, including, for example, the way it deals with slavery. More
recent examples can be found. Consider this passage from the Kenyan Constitution of
1963 (Art. 181.1), which refers the reader to six different sections in order to qualify the
powers of the court of appeal:
Subject to the provisions of sections 50(5), 61(7), 101(5) and 210 (5) of this Constitution and of
subsection (4) of this section, an appeal shall lie as of right to the Judicial Committee from any
decision given by the Court of Appeal for Kenya or the Supreme Court in any of the cases to
which this subsection applies or from any decision given in any such case by the Court of
Appeal for Eastern Africa or any other court in the exercise of any jurisdiction conferred under
section 176 of this Constitution.
These types of lexical gymnastics are not rare in our experience. A logical predictor of
interpretability, then, is the linguistic complexity of the text’s syntax. Our hypothesis is
that more linguistically complex texts should be harder to interpret.
Two other compositional features of the text that should matter are its length and
scope. We expect that verbose constitutions and, relatedly, those that deal with more
topics will be harder to interpret. Even if each of its individual provisions is relatively
clear, a constitution with more topics might still be difﬁcult to interpret because of the
interrelationship of its various parts. Our sense is that these sorts of documents place
higher costs on the reader to search and parse their more nuanced passages. Moreover,
such texts are more likely to include provisions on institutions that might be obscure (and
confusing) to readers. Although these features would not be likely to pose a problem for
constitutional lawyers, they might be problematic for average citizens – even for those
familiar with the relevant concepts.25 All told, we expect longer and more detailed texts
will be harder to interpret consistently.26
In addition to these issues of syntax and composition, consider two factors related to
the writing process itself. The ﬁrst is that constitutions are written by a collection of
authors, often by a multi-generational group across a series of temporal settings (given the
possibility of amendments). The effect of this quality of episodic drafting and revision is
not completely clear. On the one hand, frequent revision may render the text easier to
interpret as vague language and misinterpretations that arise in the original text are
corrected. On the other hand, formal amendments change the text from a document
written by one set of drafters to a document written by several sets of drafters, potentially
with different motives and expectations. Given these competing inﬂuences, we are
agnostic about the effect on interpretability of the frequency of revision.
A related issue concerns the birth order of the constitution within a national ‘family’ of
constitutions. We suspect, in general, that constitutional drafters learn from earlier drafting
experiences, rendering future sibling constitutions more interpretable. The Mexican
25 Of course, one could argue that longer, more detailed texts are easier to interpret, because the rules
of the game are more fully speciﬁed.
26 Voermans, ‘Styles of Legislation and Their Effects’, p. 50.
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experience may be instructive here. After several early attempts at creating a workable
constitution, including many ideas borrowed from abroad, the drafters of the 1857
document produced a liberal constitution intended to be understandable to all citizens. This
document, in turn, inﬂuenced the 1917 text which has been one of the more enduring
constitutions.27 Other Latin American constitutions, too, evolved away from the US model
over time, and many have sought to speak in a more indigenous voice.
Finally, consider the distinct possibility that the institutional structure established in the
constitution might also pose interpretation problems for the reader. That is, besides the
density of institutions established in the constitution, certain institutions might be harder
for non-experts to understand. In particular, we are thinking of multi-layered institutions
in which one must understand how each layer of the institution functions as well as how
each layer interacts with the others. Take, for example, the executive branch. In the
simplest case, there is a president who holds all of the power of the executive. In order to
monitor the executive under such a system, one must understand only those rules that
constrain the president. However, in a two executive system (for example, a semi-
presidential system with both a president and prime minister), citizens must understand
the rules constraining the president, the rules constraining the prime minister, and the
rules governing interactions between the two. Consequently, we expect constitutions that
provide for multi-layer institutions to produce less agreement across interpreters.
The Interpreter
Not all errors in judgement can be blamed on the constitutional text or its context. Readers
will vary in their cognitive abilities, experience and interest in interpreting constitutional
text. Variance in these attributes should be associated with variance in the degree to which
individuals can reach consensus about the meaning of constitutional provisions. This is
the problem of ‘PICNIC’, to borrow an acronym used by information-technology
(IT) consultants: Problem In Chair, Not In Computer. Substituting ‘Constitution’ for
‘Computer’ produces a legal version of this slogan. To be sure, the consultant’s PICNIC
belies a certain derision towards the lay computer user – something entirely foreign to our
sensibilities, given our assumption that constitutional texts should be accessible to those
outside the legal community. Nonetheless, one wonders – to return to the opening passage
and the Brazilian goal of accessibility – whether constitutional interpretation varies at all
with the subject’s experience with the law, education or socio-economic status. In short, are
ordinary citizens considerably more prone to misinterpretation than are elites?28 Our
working hypothesis is that those less experienced with the law will exhibit higher levels of
misinterpretation (that is to say, non-consensual interpretation).
Summary of Factors that Might Affect Interpretability of Constitutions
In this section, we have identiﬁed a number of factors that might affect the interpretability
of constitutions. These factors are categorized as those arising from the constitution’s
context, the constitutional text and the constitution’s interpreters. The implications of
these factors are wide ranging. For example, the relationship between interpretability and
27 Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, p. 179.
28 See, for example, Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution: The Supreme Court’s Obligation to
Maintain the Constitution as Something We the People Can Understand (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992).
On the Interpretability of Law 9
context may help explain why certain countries, especially multi-ethnic ones, have been
unable to adhere to the rule of law or establish self-enforcing constitutions. Furthermore,
if constitutions are difﬁcult to interpret across temporal and spatial settings, then our
results may indicate the potential dangers of both constitutional transplantation and
extreme constitutional longevity. The relationship between interpretability and factors
arising from the constitutional text itself may provide constitutional drafters with lessons
they can use to create more effective and enduring documents. Lastly, the relationship
between interpretability and the interpreter may indicate a set of skills necessary for the
public to interpret the constitution. While the test of these hypotheses, developed below,
does not easily lend itself to drawing global conclusions for real-world interpretation, it
suggests several areas for future research and provides some insight on how to create
more interpretable constitutional texts.
ANALYTIC STRATEGY
Over the last seven years, we have devoted much of our time to reading and interpreting
a large set of historical constitutions. This experience, and the systematic manner in
which we have undertaken the reading, allows for an assessment of constitutional
interpretability. Constitutions, admittedly, constitute a very speciﬁc kind of law and we
do not assert that our insights in this article apply generally across all domains of law.
Still, a constitutional text that is difﬁcult to interpret might indicate a more general lack of
clarity in the law. Moreover, as we stressed above, because constitutional contracts are
not enforceable by an external guarantor, the quality of self-enforcement (and therefore
interpretability) is especially relevant to constitutions.
The process of reading and interpreting constitutions in a systematic fashion yields
a great deal of information about the ease of interpreting constitutions. A short description
of the CCP and our coding process will demonstrate some of the analytical possibilities.
The CCP records some 668 characteristics of written constitutions in independent states
(including micro-states) since 1789. By our current accounting, the universe of cases numbers
929 independent ‘constitutional systems’; these constitutional texts have been ‘amended’
2,263 times.29 Our sample includes full information on 426 of the 929 constitutional systems,
including nearly all constitutional systems currently in force and just fewer than 50 per cent
of all constitutional systems since 1789. We say ‘full information’, since our coding process
involves several stages. Constitutional texts are coded (at least) twice by separate coders. The
codings are then reconciled by a third coder (i.e. a ‘reconciler’), who reviews all survey
responses but focuses primarily on those responses for which there are discrepancies between
the coders.30 The sample used in the analysis below is restricted to those constitutional
systems that have been coded at least twice and also reconciled.31
Coding constitutions involves a certain back-and-forth between the CCP’s survey
questions (the online ‘survey instrument’) and actual constitutional texts. Coders go
29 Elkins, Zachary, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, Chronology of Constitutional Events, Version 1.1
(Comparative Constitutions Project, last modiﬁed: 12 May 2010) – available at: http://www.
comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/index.htm.
30 We have employed a set of graduate students (both in law and political science) and highly
competent undergraduates to assist in the data collection. In total, 97 individuals have worked with us as
coders, and of this group, 18 have become reconcilers. The coders and reconcilers include a number of
graduate students from foreign countries, and native speakers of more than a dozen languages.
31 We exclude codings of slightly more than 250 constitutions that have not yet been reconciled.
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through an extensive training process. As part of this process, our coders are instructed to
focus exclusively on the constitutional text when completing the ‘survey instrument’ and
are given detailed instructions regarding known issues of interpretation that are available
in the ‘survey instrument’, on the CCP’s website and in the training manual that each
coder receives. For interpretive issues not addressed by these instructions, we have
developed a rather comprehensive process by which coders post questions about
ambiguous cases to a message board, where the cases are adjudicated by the principal
investigators. These rulings then serve as the guiding precedent for future coders who face
comparable issues – the rulings can be searched and retrieved by topic.32 The system bears
some resemblance to a kind of legal system in miniature. Our primary regulators are the
reconcilers, with the principal investigators serving as a court of ﬁnal review for all
decisions.33 To be sure, the hierarchical interpretive structure lacks some of the elements
of a real-world system of constitutional interpretation, including power relationships,
appeal by litigants, and strategic and ideational behaviour by the interpreters. However, it
bears some resemblance to the ideal of interpretation as a collective attempt to generate
certainty, a profoundly important idea in many legal systems.34
Interpretability and Reliability
What, then, can we glean about the interpretability of a constitution from this enterprise?
We begin with the assumption that disagreement among readers about answers to a
particular survey question suggests a problem of interpretation. If the question, ‘Does the
constitution prohibit censorship?’ elicits a ‘yes’ from coder A and a ‘no’ from coder B, we
infer a problem of interpretation – a problem stemming from the constitution, its context
or the coder. Note that constitutions do not need to elicit a deﬁnitive ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer
to avoid such problems. It is not uncommon for constitutional provisions to come in
shades of grey, and readers can reach inter-subjective agreement about these shades of
grey. In the case of censorship, for instance, coders could provide the intermediate
response, ‘censorship allowed in exceptional cases’.
For our analysis of consensus to be meaningful, though, we must assume that our
questions do not have multiple ‘right’ answers and, therefore, that disagreement indicates
an error in interpretation. Of course, any written text – from Solon’s Constitution to
Shakespeare’s Othello – will communicate nuanced differences in meaning to different
readers. In the realm of literature, our assumption of determinacy would clearly be
untenable. There is no consensual right answer to whether, in killing Desdemona, Othello
should be considered ‘the greatest poet of them all’ or is simply ‘egotistical’, to cite two
prominent literary interpretations.35 However, if a constitution is to serve as a general
contract underlying all political activity, we expect its terms to be mutually intelligible in
32 For the most part, the rulings are treated as settled law, although on several occasions a principal
investigator has overturned a prior decision, an action which has then precipitated the retroactive coding
of affected cases.
33 A full description of the coding procedures used by the CCP is available on the project’s website –
http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/.
34 John Henry Merryman and Roge´lio Pe´rez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition, 3rd edn (Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007).
35 Andrew C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy: Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, and Macbeth,
2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1955 [1920]); Frank R. Leavis, ‘Diabolic Intellect and the Noble Hero: or
the Sentimentalist’s Othello’, in The Common Pursuit (London: Chatto & Windus, 1952 [1937]).
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ways that art and literature are not. We can, therefore, treat any inconsistency in
interpretation across readers as a problem of interpretation.
Of course, we also recognize that a consensual answer, as we deﬁne it, is consensual
only within the conﬁnes of our small community of coders. The coders’ inter-subjective
understanding of a constitutional provision could disagree with that of the courts or the
citizenry of a country governed by the constitution in question. Nonetheless, we assume
that there is a strong correlation between the degree of consensus about a given question
among our coders and that among another set of readers. Depending upon the magnitude
of that correlation, our exercise will at times overestimate or underestimate the true
degree of interpretability of a given text. We are, after all, testing a sample of
constitutional provisions with a sample of readers and our inferences from that analysis
are decidedly probabilistic.
As we will see, coders are able to assess the meaning of constitutions with varying
degrees of error. Some of this error is associated with characteristics of the coder,
characteristics of the reconciler, or aspects of the coding process, but of more interest, at
least for the present article, some is associated with the constitution or the constitutional
setting. In part, our goal in this article is to decompose the error in interpretation into its
various parts and compare the proportion of variation associated with attributes of the
constitution and the constitutional setting (i.e. the interpretability of the document) to the
proportion associated with coders, reconcilers and the process. Assuming that we can
distinguish these contextual and textual components, we can then say something about
the factors that explain its variance across constitutions and countries.
To state this more formally, we are interested in estimating the interpretability (I) of
j constitutions in k countries and, based on the theory above, we assume interpretability is
a function of attributes of the constitution and the setting in which it is written:
I jk ¼ a0 þ atTjk þ acCk þ vk þ ujk ð1Þ
where Tjk represents t attributes of the constitutional text, Ck represents c country
attributes, at and ac are the coefﬁcients representing the impact of the t constitutional
attributes and c country attributes, respectively, and vk and ujk are the country-level and
constitution-level residuals, respectively. Interpretability is a latent variable, though, so
we cannot estimate Equation 1 directly. What we can identify are problems of
interpretation, since our coding protocol requires each constitution to be coded several
times. An aggregate accounting of these problems amounts to the reliability (R), or degree
of consistency across i repeated measurement attempts, or codings, of j constitutions.
Assuming interpretability is a function of these reliabilities yields:
Rij ¼ b0 þ bpPij þ bnI j þ uj þ rij ð2Þ
where P represents the p attributes of the coding process, bp and bn are the coefﬁcients
representing the impact of p attributes of the coding process and interpretability,
respectively, and uj and rij are the constitution and coding-level residuals, respectively.
Substituting Equation 1 for I in Equation 2 provides the reduced-form equation:
Rijk ¼ gþ bpPijk þ gtT jk þ gcCk þ eijk ð3Þ
where g5 (b01bna0), gt5bn at, and gc5bn ac, and eijk is a composite error term
that equals (bnvk1 ujk1 rijk). The following sections explain how the variables from
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Equation 3 are operationalized. The next section describes our measure of inter-coder
reliability. This is followed by a description of the variables used to represent the
country, constitutional and coding process attributes that are hypothesized to affect those
reliabilities.
Measuring Reliability
The dependent variable in the analyses is the reliability of a coder’s interpretation of a set
of constitutional provisions. Our measure of reliability is a version of inter-coder
reliability, usually understood as the probability that two independent coders will provide
the same answer to the same question. A number of issues arise in the calculation of this
quantity. The ﬁrst, given the particular structure of our coding procedure, involves the
choice of the level of coders at which to calculate inter-coder reliability. As we describe
above, we have at our disposal at least two (and sometimes three or four) independent
codings of each constitution, and we could simply measure the degree of intercoder
agreement of coder pairs. This is typically the way one calculates intercoder reliability.36
Alternatively, since we also have a more authoritative interpretation of the constitution
(the reconciliation), we could conceivably compare the coders’ responses to this standard.
Each of these approaches has its advantages. We choose the latter approach mostly
because it allows for multiple assessments of the interpretability of each constitution, but
this approach also has the advantage of increasing the precision of our measure of
reliability. Imagine, for example, two coders who differ markedly in reading skills. The
two might disagree on many answers largely because of the weaker coder’s erroneous
judgements, which would result in a low reliability score associated with the weak
and strong coder alike, as well as the constitutional text. By contrast, comparing each
coding to a reconciler’s response allows us to identify the source of error more precisely
and selectively. Therefore, we have constructed a dataset of coder–reconciler dyads, and
for each we calculated the degree of agreement across a set of binary assessments
of agreement (1) or disagreement (0) with respect to questions from the CCP’s survey
instrument.
The next issue that arises has to do with the selection of items across which to observe
agreement. As we have mentioned, the survey instrument includes 668 questions.
However, not all constitutions speak to each of these questions. Some of these questions
are ‘root’ questions that ascertain the presence of a constitutional provision on a
particular topic and are followed by branching questions that pursue the provisions in
more detail. Some constitutions, therefore, will have missing observations on some of
these branched questions based on a coder’s response to a root question. Furthermore,
survey questions come in several varieties. Some are closed-ended questions with mutually
exclusive choices (‘Does the constitution provide for the right to free speech?’), others are
closed-ended questions with non-exclusive choices (‘Which of the following are
requirements to serve as a member of the lower house of the legislature?’) and still
others are open-ended questions (‘Describe any details (other than those already covered)
of the process of amending the constitution’). Finally, questions vary remarkably by their
36 Howard E. A. Tinsley and David J. Weiss, ‘Interrater Reliability and Agreement’, in Howard E. A.
Tinsley and Steven D. Brown, eds, Handbook of Applied Multivariate Statistics and Mathematical Modeling
(San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, 2000), pp. 95–124; Matthew Lombard, Jennifer Snyder-Duch and
Cheryl Campanella Bracken, ‘Content Analysis in Mass Communication: Assessment and Reporting of
Intercoder Reliability’, Human Communication Research, 28 (2002), 587–604.
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degree of error. Some questions are highly consensual across coders and reconcilers with
literally no disagreement, while others exhibit levels of agreement as low as 28 per cent. If
we were to report an estimate of overall reliability for our data, it might make sense to
include items irrespective of their variation in error. However, if we are interested in
explaining the variation in the degree of error, one would be tempted to exclude the highly
consensual items lest they dilute the informational value of the other items.
Our approach to these various issues is to (1) use only the 520 closed-ended questions from
the CCP’s survey instrument, (2) treat answers of ‘not applicable’ to branched questions like
any other answer, and (3) weight questions based on their difﬁculty (as measured by the
agreement between coder and reconciler across all cases). Or, more formally:
Rijk ¼
Pn
q¼1
ðwqAiqÞ
Pn
q¼1
ðwqÞ
0
BBB@
1
CCCA 100; ð4Þ
where Aiq is the correspondence between the coder and reconciler on question q of n
questions, and wq is the weight assigned to question q and is equal to 1minus the intercoder
reliability for that question.37 One can think of the measure, then, as the percentage of
questions that the coder agreed with the reconciler for a given constitution, weighted by the
difﬁculty of each question. The resulting measure ranges from 0 to 100. We should note that
the weights provide a useful correction not only to highly consensual (i.e., easy) questions
but also to questions that are commonly left unanswered as a result of ‘pruned branches’
within the questionnaire. At the extreme, the inﬂuence of such highly consensual questions is
reduced to zero. Thus, the measure elaborated in Equation 4 controls for an important
source of variation in the reliability of our data that might contaminate the analysis below:
variance in the difﬁculty of questions.
Measuring Attributes of the Constitutional Context and Text
Our theory speciﬁes a number of factors arising from the constitution and the context in
which it is written, which might affect its interpretability. Here we discuss the measurement
of the textual and contextual factors jointly, since they occupy the same level of
measurement. These and all of our measurement choices are summarized in Table 1.
To recall, our hypotheses with respect to context have to do with the challenge of
understanding documents written in a different setting, in particular those situations in
which the drafter and reader are separated by era, language and culture. The logic of our
measurement strategy is based on a comparison of the generation, experience and
37 We measure intercoder reliability using Cohen’s kappa. Kappa is the most commonly used measure of
intercoder reliability that discounts for the probability of coders agreeing by chance (Michael E. Dewey,
‘Coefﬁcients of Agreement’, British Journal of Psychiatry, 143 (1983), 487–9; Roger Bakeman, ‘Behavioral
Observation and Coding’, in Harry T. Reis and Charles M. Judge, eds, Handbook of Research Methods in
Social and Personality Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 138–59. It can
theoretically range from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates perfect agreement between coders on a question and 0
indicates no agreement other than that arising by chance. We use an augmented version of kappa that
calculates agreement between coders’ and reconcilers’ answers. So, for a constitution coded by two coders,
rather than calculating the probability of agreement between Coder 1 and Coder 2, we calculate the
probability of agreement between Coder 1 and the reconciler as well as between Coder 2 and the
reconciler. The resulting measure ranges from 0.28 to 1.00 with a mean of 0.93.
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TABLE 1 Description of Variables
Variable Operationalization
Expected
effect
Contextual Attributes
Promulgation Century Year the constitution was promulgated (in hundreds) 2
Constitutional Birth
Order
Number of constitutions previously promulgated in the
country
1
Coded in English Binary variable coded one if the coded text was originally
written in or translated to English
1
Ofﬁcial English Binary variable coded one if the text is from a country where
English is an ofﬁcial language
1
Common Law Binary variable coded one if the country has a common law
legal tradition
2
Region Binary variables coded one for each respective region (the
region denoted as Western Europe, the United States and
Canada is the reference category)
2
Constitutional Attributes
Number of
Amendment-years
Number of periods (years) during which the text was formally
amended
2
Length Number of words in the text of the constitution
(in ten-thousands)
2
Scope Percentage of selected issues covered in the constitution 2
Multiple Executives Binary variable coded one if the constitution speciﬁes more
than one executive
2
Multiple Houses Binary variable coded one if the constitution speciﬁes, for
consistency more than one house of the legislature
2
Multi-level Judiciary Binary variable coded one if constitution speciﬁes, for
consistency the existence of more than one layer of the
judiciary
2
Multi-level State Binary variable coded one if the constitution speciﬁes that
state authority is devolved to at least one sub-national unit
(i.e. federalism)
2
Flesch Score The Flesch readability index, which measures reading ease as
a function of words per sentence and syllables per word
2
Once-only Words Percentage of the total number of unique words that appear
only once in the text
2
Procedural Attributes
Coder Experience Number of codings completed by the coder 1
Education Binary variables coded one for each respective level of
education (undergraduate students are the reference
category)
1
School Binary variables coded one for each respective school
(University of Illinois is the reference category)
0
Coder Messages Total number of messages posted to the message board by the
coder (in hundreds)
1
Reconciler Messages Total number of messages posted to the message board by the
reconciler (in hundreds)
2
Days Elapsed Number of days a constitution took for the coder to complete
(in hundreds)
1
Days Differential Number of days between the end date of the coding and the
start date of the reconciliation (in hundreds)
2
Total codings Total number of codings completed for a constitution 2
Missing from coding Total number of ‘not applicable’ responses from the coding
(in hundreds)
1
Missing from
reconciliation
Total number of ‘not applicable’ responses from the
reconciliation (in hundreds)
1
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nationality of the reader (characteristics that vary minimally in our study) with the more
widely varying contextual characteristics of the sampled constitutions. Most of our coders
are young (20-something) US graduate students engaging in the exercise sometime
between 2005 and 2010. These readers, while unusually knowledgeable about political
and legal institutions (given their course of study), are not experts in historical and
comparative constitutional jurisprudence.
We operationalize temporal distance as the year in which the constitution was
promulgated. For linguistic distance, we include two measures. We have completed
approximately 975 codings of texts that are either translated to, or originally composed
in, English, and 29 codings of texts in languages other than English. The latter are coded
by native or ﬂuent speakers of the language in question. We include an indicator variable
that identiﬁes whether the text was one of the 29 non-English texts and, thus, at linguistic
odds with the reconciled coding which was performed with an English version of the text.
We also include a second indicator variable that identiﬁes whether the constitutional text
was translated into English, which we infer by identifying whether English is one of the
ofﬁcial languages of the country.38 We expect both translated and non-English texts to
exhibit less clarity than would those either written in or read in English. To capture
cultural differences, we rely upon geography and legal culture. Since our coders are
largely from the United States, it is likely that constitutions from some regions –
particularly Asia and Africa – will be more difﬁcult to interpret than will those from
Europe and the Americas. Thus, we have included a series of regional indicator variables,
in which constitutions from Western Europe, the United States and Canada constitute the
reference category. In addition, we have included a binary variable to indicate common
law countries with the expectation that their constitutions will be easier for coders coming
from a common law tradition to interpret.39
Consider now the factors associated with the text itself. The ﬁrst factor is the complexity,
or readability, of the constitutional prose. We employ two measures of complexity. The ﬁrst
is the Flesch index, which computes readability as a function of sentence length and word
length. A second measure – word uniqueness – calculates the percentage of words that
appear only once in the text, a quantity that captures the breadth of vocabulary employed
by authors. Typically, a heavy use of unique words is associated with low levels of
readability. In constitutions, however, a high number of single-use words might actually
render the text easier to understand, as it indicates brevity and minimal cross referencing.
That is, provisions of particular institutions may appear in only very limited fashion,
as opposed to appearing in several detailed passages. This latter point is related to two
other critical factors, length and scope. Our model includes measures of the length of
the constitution, in words, and its scope, or the density of constitutional provisions in the
constitution. We measure scope by counting the number of topics that are addressed in the
text as a percentage of a set of seventy topics from our survey.40 Our expectation is that
longer, denser constitutions will be more challenging for our coders.
38 Data on ofﬁcial language are from Thierry Mayer and Soledad Zignago, ‘CEPII’s Distance
Measures’, available from: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm (2006). The source of
translations varies: some are ofﬁcial government texts while others are produced by academics and others.
39 Data on legal tradition are from the University of Ottawa, ‘JuriGlobe: World Legal Systems
Research Group’, available at: http://www.juriglobe.ca/index.php (2010).
40 See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) for a description of this measure.
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Another factor associated with the text of the constitution is institutional complexity. We
have included four indicator variables that identify constitutions with multi-layered executives,
legislatures, judiciaries or sub-national units (i.e. federalist states) to assess whether such
institutions posed interpretive problems for our coders. However, apart from complexity, we
also harboured some suspicions about whether certain kinds of institutional arrangements
would be more difﬁcult to assess across context. Most of our coders, for example, were more
familiar with presidential executives and bicameral legislatures as a result of being educated in
the United States. This familiarity might mute the impact of institutional complexity.
Finally, consider the factors associated with the evolution of the constitution and the
constitutional history of the country in question. We measured the accretion associated
with frequent modiﬁcation by including a variable that sums the number of distinct years
in which amendments had been promulgated. For example, coders of the US Constitution
read the document that was in force in 1992, at which time the Constitution had been
amended twenty-seven times during sixteen different periods (years).41 The score for the
United States is thus sixteen. We note two aspects of this measure. First, it is a measure
of the accumulation of amendments, not the amendment rate. Secondly, it only
imperfectly captures the scope of constitutional revision. Conceivably, amendments could
change as little as one word and as much as the entire text. Counting either the number
of ‘amendments’ or the number of amendment-years will suffer from this sort of
heterogeneity in scope. However, the latter has the beneﬁt of capturing the number of
amendment episodes, and our reasoning is that episodic revision adds distortion over and
above that caused by revision itself. For birth order, we included a counter variable that
indicates the number of previously promulgated constitutions in each country.
Characteristics Associated with the Coder, Reconciler and the Coding Process
For our purposes, the interpreters are the CCP’s coders and reconcilers. We include a
complete set of coder, reconciler and procedural attributes in the model below to ensure
that our parameter estimates at the country level and constitution level are unbiased.
Virtually all of these variables are interesting to us from a procedural perspective, but
some also have clear substantive implications. One such variable has to do with how
experienced the coder is with reading constitutions and, more generally, with
constitutional law. Also, because our sample of coders drew from a set of political
science graduate students, law students and undergraduates – all at different points in
their training and at three different academic institutions – we were able to assess any
differences associated with this variation in academic experience. Admittedly, this
variation may differ in kind and degree from that among real-world elites – from
politicians to judges – grappling with constitutional interpretation. Still, differences in
error rates associated with these characteristics provide a helpful empirical baseline.
Apart from experience, some coders would be more conscientious and, perhaps, possess
sharper interpretive abilities than others. We have several measures of something resembling
conscientiousness. One is the number of questions, on average, that a coder posted to the
message board under the theory that those who asked questions were more engaged in the
project and would exhibit lower error rates. A second is the number of elapsed days spent
coding a constitution (a period that includes time ‘on’ and ‘off’ the clock) under the theory
41 We include the Bill of Rights as a single amendment, since all ten amendments included in the Bill of
Rights were passed at the same time.
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that those coders who worked more steadily would be more reliable than those who
interpreted a document over a longer stretch of time and, presumably, episodically.
We recognize that either of these variables could be interpreted a number of ways. So, both
the number of message board posts and the length of coding time could be a reﬂection of the
difﬁculty or length of the constitution, and not the coder’s abilities or engagement. However,
our experience leads us to believe that these variables primarily tap coder characteristics and,
moreover, our model controls for the length and difﬁculty of the constitutional text.
We also include a set of covariates in the model that help us control for confounds,
based on our measure of the dependent variable and various procedural factors. These
variables include: (1) the number of days between coding and reconciliation, to account
for changes in our interpretive standards and doctrine over the course of the project; (2)
the number of codings completed for a particular constitution, since more codings will
increase the probability of a discrepancy for any given question and, thus, the likelihood
that a reconciler will review an answer; and (3) a measure of the number of ‘non-
applicable’ responses per constitution (in both coding and reconciliation), since
constitutions that elicit a high frequency of these responses will produce higher
agreement between coder and reconciler and, thus, may bias the estimate of the effect
of constitutional scope. Recall that our measure of reliability weights questions in a way
that accounts for questions that tend to have large numbers of ‘non-applicable’ responses.
The variable listed in (3) above does something similar, but for constitutions.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The structure of our data introduces several peculiarities in the analysis. While our unit of
analysis is the coder–reconciler dyad, our variables are measured at three different levels:
that of the (1) country; (2) constitution; and (3) the coder–reconciler dyad.42 Since
information from each of these levels appears multiple times across the data, observations
are not independent of each other, as assumed by typical ordinary least squares
regression. One way to account for this non-independence is simply to include ﬁxed effects
for coder–reconciler dyads and to adjust the standard errors by clustering them at the
level of the constitution. This simple strategy would allow us to isolate and explain the
variance in reliability at the level of constitutions and the context in which they are
written, the levels of most interest to us. Yet, the strategy fails to take the hierarchical
structure of the data into account, which leads to less efﬁcient coefﬁcient estimates,43 and
it virtually eliminates all of the variance arising from the coding process, which is also of
some interest to us. Thus, we model Equation 3 using a least squares regression model
with a random-intercept at the level of the constitution.44
Baseline Measures of Reliability
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of our measure of reliability. On average, coder–reconciler
agreement across the set of 520 items is 80.9 per cent, with a standard deviation of 7.96.
42 Some aspects of context are measured at the country level and some at the constitution level.
43 Tom Snijders and Roel Bosker,Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Multilevel
Modeling (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1999).
44 Equation 3 suggests that we use a three-level model, with random intercepts for both the country and
the constitution. We do not report the results from a three-level model, because when we did estimate such
a model, the country-level random-intercept was statistically insigniﬁcant.
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This rate of error (inter-coder agreement on only four ﬁfths of questions) provides
a sense of the inherent difﬁculty in interpreting constitutions. By calculating the mean
coder–reconciler agreement per constitution, we can use these data to identify what
appear to be the more troublesome and least troublesome texts. Those constitutions
eliciting the highest level of agreement across readers were Haiti (1811), Thailand (1959)
and Pakistan (2003), all with reliability scores above 95 per cent. Those with lowest level
of agreement were France (1958), India (1949), Cape Verde (1980), Mexico (1917) and
Guyana (1995), all with reliability scores below 65 per cent. Remember, of course, that
some of the inter-coder error could be attributed to coder-speciﬁc or procedure-speciﬁc
factors, something we will account for in the regression models below. Still, it is
instructive at this point to inspect the scores of particular cases. The US Constitution,
perhaps surprisingly, has a level of inter-coder agreement of only 85 per cent. That level of
error suggests an above-average degree of reliability to be sure, but it still means that
coders and reconcilers disagreed on almost 15 per cent of our survey questions for the
constitution that was presumably the most familiar to them. The lengthy Brazilian
Constitution, whose drafters commissioned a style consultant whose advice they then
disregarded, comes in at 83 per cent, just above the sample mean.
Analytically, we have posited three classes (levels) of factors – context, the constitution,
and the coder and coding process – and we assume that each of these levels accounts
for some non-zero fraction of the variance in reliability. An ANOVA allows us to
partition the variance by level and make some initial judgements about where the
sources of indeterminacy lie. In fact, the ANOVA results suggest that each factor
explains a signiﬁcant fraction of the variance in reliability, with the entire model
explaining 70 per cent of the overall variance in reliability, respectively. A large
fraction of the variance can be attributed to the coder and the coding process (26 per
cent). Yet, the constitution and context explain 21 and 18 per cent of the variance in
reliability. Thus, context and the constitutional text together explain almost as much of
the variance in reliability as does the coding process. Recalling PICNIC, then, this
suggests that the problem of indeterminacy lies almost equally between the constitution
and the chair.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of the Reliability Measure
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Explaining Variation in Interpretability
We described a rather inclusive set of hypotheses above, many of which deserve deeper
pursuit. Table 2 reports regression results from four model speciﬁcations: (1) variables
associated with the coder and coding process; (2) the variables from Model 1 plus the
constitutional attributes; (3) the variables from Model 1 plus the contextual attributes;
(4) variables from all three levels provided that none of the variables contain missing data;
(5) all variables. Here we focus on the effects of variables that implicate some of the
challenges to sustaining the rule of law, as conceptualized above.
Consider ﬁrst the impact of context on constitutional interpretation. This group of
variables is notable for its lack of explanatory power. Only four variables (constitutional
age, a common law legal tradition, Eastern Europe and East Asia) exhibit effects
signiﬁcantly different from zero in at least one speciﬁcation of the model. And of these
four variables, only constitutional age has a robust statistically signiﬁcant effect across the
three speciﬁcations in which it is included. On average, coders have a harder time
interpreting older constitutions than they do contemporary ones. Nonetheless, the effect
of age is small. Reliability appears to decrease by about 0.02 with each year of age of the
constitution. Even at the extremes – e.g., comparing a constitution written in 2010 to one
in 1810 – the effects appear modest: we would expect the oldest constitution to have a
reliability score only about 4 points lower than that of the youngest constitution (an effect
no greater than a half standard deviation in reliability). The other contextual factors
are not robust predictors and, indeed, some of their coefﬁcients exhibit signs that are
opposite to the predicted direction. Speciﬁcally, constitutions written in distinct cultures
(i.e., constitutions written in Eastern Europe and East Asia) are, if anything, actually
more interpretable than those in the reference category. Also, translation apparently does
not produce any added distortion; readers provide equally reliable interpretations of
constitutions whether they are drafted in English, translated to English, or read in a non-
English original version.45 All told, these contextual results are quite surprising with
potentially far-reaching implications. Neither era nor language nor culture has any
signiﬁcant effects on a reader’s ability to interpret institutional provisions – a ﬁnding that
may have implications for debates about intergenerational constraints, national unity
and enforceability. Constitutional language, it seems, may be quite understandable across
time and space.
By contrast, elements of the constitutional text – no matter its provenance – seem to
affect interpretation. Three variables stand out as both statistically and substantively
signiﬁcant across all of the models in Table 2: scope, percentage of once-only words, and
multiple executives. One of the largest effects that we ﬁnd is that of scope. A one-unit
change in scope decreases reliability by about 13 points. The magnitude of this coefﬁcient
may be deceiving, since, in our sample, scope ranges only from 0.15 (the 1953
Constitution of Bhutan or 1969 Constitution of Libya) to 0.80 (the 1997 Constitution of
Thailand). Even across this more limited range, however, the difference in predicted
reliability is substantial: interpreters would lose approximately 8 points in reliability in
moving from the sparse Bhutan Constitution of 1953 to the dense Thai document of 1997.
The syntax and grammatical structure of the text appears to affect interpretability, but
only minimally and, perhaps, counter-intuitively. The Flesch index of complexity – again,
computed from the length of sentences and words – has no perceptible effect on our
45 The language variables are also jointly insigniﬁcant (Pr(x25 0)5 0.87).
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TABLE 2 Statistical Models of Reliability
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Contextual Attributes
Promulgation Century 22.10** 22.25** 21.63y
(0.69) (0.75) (0.86)
Constitution Birth Order 0.04 0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Coded English 20.32 20.41 20.18
(1.04) (1.04) (1.16)
Ofﬁcial English 20.00 20.05 0.43
(0.74) (0.77) (0.86)
Common Law 0.85 1.21y 1.51y
(0.67) (0.69) (0.79)
Latin America 0.94 0.23 20.21
(0.83) (0.89) (1.01)
Eastern Europe 2.88** 2.04* 1.40
(0.87) (0.88) (1.00)
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.96* 1.17 0.10
(0.86) (0.89) (1.02)
North Africa/Middle East 1.31 1.32 0.50
(0.98) (0.98) (1.11)
South Asia 2.48y 1.72 1.28
(1.39) (1.39) (1.52)
East Asia 2.90** 2.26* 1.54
(0.92) (0.93) (1.07)
Oceania 1.60 0.22 0.33
(1.39) (1.43) (1.82)
Constitutional Attributes
Number of Amendment-years 20.03 20.05 20.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Length 20.06 20.11 0.16
(0.17) (0.22) (0.32)
Scope 215.82** 213.93** 212.33*
(3.89) (4.14) (4.80)
Multiple Executives 21.55** 21.77** 21.61*
(0.49) (0.57) (0.63)
Multiple Houses 20.15 20.42 20.31
(0.41) (0.43) (0.48)
Multi-level Judiciary 20.06 20.18 1.15
(1.16) (1.16) (1.30)
Multi-level State 1.09y 1.10y 1.12
(0.61) (0.62) (0.70)
Flesch Score 20.01
(0.01)
Once-only Words 0.26**
(0.08)
Procedural Attributes
Coder Experience 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Law Student 20.08 20.10 20.08 20.10 0.10
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.46)
Graduate Student 20.25 20.29 20.23 20.23 20.05
(0.56) (0.55) (0.56) (0.56) (0.61)
University of Chicago 1.67 1.99 1.47 1.82 0.99
(1.46) (1.45) (1.47) (1.46) (1.84)
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coders’ reliability. By contrast, a measure of the breadth of language – the percentage of
words that appear only once – has a moderately positive effect on reliability. This result is
counter-intuitive. Typically, the use of unique words is expected to decrease a document’s
readability. In the case of constitutions, it appears to have the opposite, quite large, effect;
for a maximal change in the percentage of once-only words (from 1 to 32 per cent),
the change in reliability is expected to be 8 points, about the same as that of scope. One
could speculate that the lack of repetition suggests a lack of excessive cross referencing,
which could ease interpretation. Such speculation would be supported by the fact that
the lowest occurrence of once-only words is found in the Kenyan Constitution of 1963
(only 1 per cent), which was noted above to be quite repetitive and difﬁcult to interpret,
and the highest occurrence in Ethiopia’s Constitution of 1991 (32 per cent), an interim
constitution that is very concise and only a few pages long. Of course, this is mostly
speculation. All we can reliably infer from these results is that once-only words increase
interpretability.
The other textual effect that is consistently statistically signiﬁcant is the presence of
multiple executives. It seems that our coders had a signiﬁcantly harder time interpreting
constitutions that contained provisions for multiple executives, such as those found in
semi-presidential systems. Constitutions with multiple executives have reliability scores
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
University of Texas 0.04 0.30 20.07 0.20 1.00
(2.01) (2.00) (2.02) (2.01) (2.44)
Coder Messages 3.77** 3.86** 3.80** 3.90** 3.93**
(0.66) (0.67) (0.68) (0.67) (0.72)
Reconciler Messages 20.08* 20.08* 20.09* 20.08* 20.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Days Elapsed 20.86y 20.77 20.82 20.67 20.36
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.53)
Days Differential 20.28** 20.24** 20.27** 20.22** 20.21*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Total Codings 20.41 20.34 20.59y 20.52* 20.54
(0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.33)
Missing from Coding 24.66** 24.68** 24.67** 24.70** 24.77**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.23)
Missing from Reconciliation 5.81** 4.83** 5.68** 4.69** 4.63**
(0.20) (0.32) (0.22) (0.34) (0.39)
Constant 78.71** 93.60** 119.42** 137.46** 121.57**
(1.27) (4.30) (13.75) (15.81) (18.44)
r 0.25** 0.23** 0.24** 0.22** 0.22**
R2 within groups 0.379 0.378 0.379 0.379 0.348
R2 between groups 0.607 0.628 0.627 0.647 0.639
R2 overall 0.546 0.560 0.559 0.573 0.555
Number of groups 441 441 441 441 397
Observations 1,004 1,004 1,004 1,004 868
Notes: Coefﬁcient estimates from least squares regression model with random intercepts
between constitutions. Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcant indicated as
follows: **5p, 0.01; *5p, 0.05; y5p, 0.1.
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about 1.5 points lower than do constitutions with a single executive. Although this
result is indicative of the complexity of constitutions that specify multiple executives, we
do not want to place too much emphasis on it. Because most of our coders were educated
exclusively in the United States, it is quite possible that our coders tended to have
trouble interpreting unfamiliarly structured executives. Moreover, the effect of multiple
executives is relatively small compared to the other textual variables and, notably, none of
the other institutional variables is consistently statistically signiﬁcant.
Consider now the characteristics of our interpreters and the process by which they
interpreted the documents. Some of these variables, we have suggested, bear substantive
importance. One question is whether constitutions are accessible to all citizens, whether
legal specialists or not. That is, to return to the case of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988,
should we be concerned that the ‘accessibility’ suggestions made by the linguistic
consultant were ultimately ignored by Brazilian elites? Given our project’s research
design, we do not know how average citizens would respond to the questions posed by
our survey instrument. However, we can provide some tentative results based on the
relative experience and conscientiousness of our own coders. For example, it is clear that
the reliability of coders improved with each constitution that they coded (an increase
of about 0.04 per coding). So, after ﬁfty codings – the level reached by our veteran coders
–reliability scores are expected to increase by 2 points, a decided but modest increase
in reliability. For educational experience, however, we did not see notable differences
in reliability across the characteristics of coders. Law students, for example, did not
differ appreciably from other graduate students or even our bright undergraduates
with respect to their reliability. One implication is that politicians – whether legally
trained or not – may not differ in their understanding of their constitution. Similarly,
it is interesting – if unsurprising – to note that interpreters who are more likely to pose
queries to the message board are more likely to have high reliability; reliability increases
by about 0.03 for each query posted. The amount of time spent interpreting a given
constitution, by contrast, seems to have no impact. In sum, we conclude that experience
clearly has some effect on reliability, but without adopting a different research design,
we are reluctant to extend these ﬁndings to make the sort of elite–mass claims that
connect to rule of law.
Another ﬁnding related to time has to do with the effect of the accumulation of
interpretive doctrine, as represented by the incremental growth in the set of instructions
we gave to coders regarding known interpretability problems. Here we ﬁnd that the effect
of the days elapsed between the coding and reconciliation of a constitution has the
predicted negative effect on the degree of error, with an effect of about 0.002 per day.
That is, for example, a coding done in 2005 but reconciled in 2010 (1,825 days apart)
would be 3.65 points less reliable than would the average coding–reconciliation pair.
Apparently, then, our adjudication of ambiguous cases – and the doctrinal case law thus
created – has indeed shifted the meaning of constitutions as far as our coders are
concerned. One need not read too much into this effect, but it does seem to conﬁrm – if
conﬁrmation were needed – that the answers to constitutional questions do depend
measurably upon the interpretive standards set by a ruling court. This suggests, by
analogy, that the US Constitution has a different inter-subjective meaning today than it
did in 1789, not because of contextual factors per se, but because of accumulated case law.
Originalists may be pleased with the ﬁnding that inter-generational interpretation is
possible; but must also acknowledge that courts have already transformed the text well
beyond original understandings or plain meaning in many cases.
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CONCLUSION
Many theorists have argued that interpretability – which we have deﬁned here as inter-
subjective agreement about the meaning of law – is a central element of the rule of law and
facilitates constitutionalism. We recognize that there are some counter-arguments in favour of
leaving constitutions constructively ambiguous. Regardless of one’s normative position on this
matter, it has understandably been hard to measure and assess interpretability empirically.
Using data from a project conceived to interpret a large set of national constitutions, we
have assessed the impact of factors within three levels of constitutional production and
consumption – the constitutional setting, the text and the interpreter – on coder reliability,
which we believe proxies for constitutional interpretability more broadly. We ﬁnd that
constitutions vary widely in their interpretability and that the qualities of the interpreter
account for about half of the explained variance with the remaining explained variance
attributable equally to the context in which the text was written and attributes of the text itself.
We generalize from our results with caution. We recognize that there are profound
differences between, on the one hand, our coders, who are mainly graduate students in
American institutions and, on the other hand, the citizens and elites who are called upon to
interpret constitutional texts in the real world. Moreover, our coding exercise is decidedly
text-centric, and our coders are not steeped in the norms of interpretation of a given
country. In that sense, our measure of interpretability may well underestimate the effect of
contextual factors. Further work will be required to conﬁrm the relationship between the
factors we identify and real-world ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of constitutional interpretation.
Nevertheless, our ﬁndings provide an empirical baseline on which scholars can build and we
conclude with some speculative thoughts on normative implications.
Surprisingly, the aspects of context that would seem to threaten interpretability the most –
era, language and culture – have relatively little effect on our coders’ abilities to interpret
constitutions. Of the contextual factors we assess, only the age of the constitution has a
statistically signiﬁcant effect on interpretability, and the effect is a small one. This set of
essentially null effects is our most important ﬁnding, because it suggests that constitutional
texts are generally interpretable across settings – the sine qua non for successful constitutions.
Along the temporal dimension, the implication is that intergenerational commitment is
possible, or at least that era-speciﬁc text will not thwart intergenerational communication, the
minimal basis of such commitment. Along the cultural dimension, our ﬁnding that differences
in language and culture do not obstruct interpretation would seem particularly advantageous
in multi-ethnic societies where constitutions, one hopes, might help to provide a sense of
national unity. Constitutions written by competing groups may be rejected, but it seems
unlikely that a lack of constitutional interpretability contributes to any of that. What is more,
this cross-cultural ﬂexibility may also assist those drafters who – for better or worse – are
predisposed to learn and borrow from constitutions beyond their borders. One may, of course,
have a normative preference for indigenous design but, given the high degree of conformity in
constitutional drafting, it is comforting to think that imported law will be comprehensible.
It is likely that these ﬁndings about context will strike some readers as having
implications for normative theories of constitutional interpretation. Originalism, in
particular, would seem to presuppose that constitutions drafted in one temporal
setting can be easily interpreted by subjects living in a very different temporal setting.46
46 Antonin Scalia, ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’, University of Chicago Law Review, 56 (1989),
1175–88.
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Such perennial debates are far-reaching and multidimensional, and we view our results as
largely tangential to that heated discussion. Indeed, it is one question as to whether
modern citizens can agree about what an eighteenth-century document means and quite
another to ask how loosely one should adhere to that meaning. The latter question is
clearly a thorny normative one and no amount of empirical research is likely to put it to
rest. The former question, however, has an answer and, in our minds, it is a surprising
one. The implications of that answer go well beyond disputes about judicial philosophy
and to the heart and basis of constitutionalism itself. To repeat the claim in the
previous paragraph, our results suggest simply (but importantly) that inter-generational
commitment is practicable.
Readers may not appear to have much difﬁculty interpreting constitutions written
outside of their environment, but several aspects of the text itself – no matter where
or when it was written – appear to threaten interpretability. We identify two textual
attributes that have considerable effects on interpretability – scope and once-only words.
Our analyses reveal that constitutions which deal with more topics are signiﬁcantly harder
to interpret. Conversely, constitutions that contain a high percentage of once-only words
were signiﬁcantly easier for our coders to interpret, possibly due to the brief treatment of
topics and lack of extensive cross referencing. The normative implications for drafters
who wish to communicate with clarity may be to set up basic institutions with simple
language, and to avoid complex cross-reference schemes that will make it difﬁcult even for
highly educated readers to understand. There may well be some disadvantages to such
‘framework’ constitutions but these documents do, evidently, have the virtue of clarity.
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